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DESTRUCTIBILITY AND AXIOMATIZABILITY OF KAUFMANN MODELS
COREY BACAL SWITZER
Abstract. A Kaufmann model is an ω1-like, recursively saturated, rather classless model of
PA. Such models were constructed by Kaufmann under ♦ and Shelah showed they exist in ZFC
by an absoluteness argument. Kaufmann models are an important witness to the incompactness
of ω1 similar to Aronszajn trees. In this paper we look at some set theoretic issues related to this
motivated by the seemingly na¨ıve question of whether such a model can be “killed” by forcing
without collapsing ω1. We show that the answer to this question is independent of ZFC and
closely related to similar questions about Aronszajn trees. As an application of these methods
we also show that it is independent of ZFC whether or not Kaufmann models can be axiomatized
in the logic Lω1,ω(Q) where Q is the quantifier “there exists uncountably many”.
1. Introduction
A Kaufmann model is an ω1-like, recursively saturated, rather classless model of PA (these
terms are defined below). Kaufmann first constructed such models in [4] under ♦ and in [10] She-
lah showed that Kaufmann models exist in ZFC by an absoluteness argument. These structures
form an important class of models of arithmetic that have been extensively studied, see [7, Chapter
10] and the references therein. There are several reasons for this. First of all Kaufmann models
represent a counterexample to the analogue of several theorems about countable recursively sat-
urated models of PA holding at the uncountable including most notably the fact that countable
recursively saturated models of PA have inductive partial satisfaction classes, see [7, Theorem 1.9.3,
Proposition 1.9.4]. They also are a witness of set theoretic incompactness at ω1. For instance, the
following is immediate from the fact that all countable, recursively saturated models of PA have
satisfaction classes and Tarski’s theorem on the undefinability of truth.
Proposition 1.1. Let M be a Kaufmann model. By rather classlessness M cannot have a partial
inductive satisfaction class. However, there is a club of countable elementary submodels N ≺ M
so that N carries a satisfaction class.
Kaufmann models are also very closely related to trees. This was used in Shelah’s absoluteness
proof and also features prominently in Schmerl’s work on generalizations of Kaufmann models to
higher cardinals [9]. The analogy with trees is the jumping off point for the current work. Our
na¨ıve question that started this work was whether there could be a Kaufmann model which could
be killed by forcing without collapsing ω1. Note that this is similar to asking whether there is an
Aronszajn tree to which an uncountable branch can be added by forcing with out collapsing ω1.
The answer in that case is independent: if there is a Souslin tree the answer is ”yes” while if all
Aronszajn trees are special the answer is “no”. In the case of Kaufmann models the answer turns
out to be the same. Specifically we prove the following theorem (proved as Theorems 2.1 and 3.1
respectively).
Main Theorem 1.2. (1) Assume MAℵ1 holds. IfM is a Kaufmann model and P is a forcing
notion so that P“M is not Kaufmann” then P collapses ω1.
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(2) Assume ♦ holds. There is a Kaufmann model M and a Souslin tree S so that forcing with
S adds a satisfaction class to M.
It remains unclear whether the property of “being destructible by ω1-preserving forcing” has a
completely combinatorial or model theoretic characterization but the models used in the proof of
Main Theorem 1.2 can be used to show the following, which is the second main theorem of this
paper (See Theorem 4.3 below).
Main Theorem 1.3. Let Q be the quantifier “there exists uncountably many ...” and Lω1,ω(Q)
be the infinitary logic Lω1,ω enriched by this quantifier. The following hold:
(1) Under MAℵ1 there is an Lω1,ω(Q) sentence ψ in the language of PA enriched with a single
unary function symbol f , LPA(f), so that a model M |= PA is Kaufmann if and only if
there is an expansion of M to an LPA(f)-structure satisfying ψ.
(2) Under ♦ there is a Kaufmann model M so that given any expansion L′ of the language of
PA and any expansion of M to an L′-structure, M′, and any countable set L of Lω1,ω(Q)
sentences in the signature L′ there is a model N which agrees with M′ about the truth
of every L-sentence but carries a satisfaction class for its L-reduct. In particular, the
L-reduct of N is not rather classless.
Informally the Main Theorem 1.3 can be phrased as saying it’s independent of ZFC if Kaufmann
models can be axiomatized by an Lω1,ω(Q) sentence. This logic is a natural one to consider in
the context of such models since being ω1-like and recursively saturated are expressible here hence
the question is really about inexpressibility of rather classlessness. Moreover this logic plays an
important role in Shelah’s aforementioned absoluteness result, [10, Theorem 6], and is used in
several other applications of abstract model theory to ω1-like structures, see [5]. In fact, part 1
can be deduced as an immediate corollary of the proof of [10, Theorem 6]. I do not know if this
was observed by Shelah at the time. Part 2, as far as I know, is completely new.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the remaining half of this introduction we
give some basic definitions and background that will be used throughout. In Section 2 Part 1 of
Main Theorem 1.2 is proved. In Section 3 Part 2 of Main Theorem 1.2 is proved. In Section 4
Main Theorem 1.3 is proved. Section 5 concludes with some open questions and lines for further
research.
Acknowledgments. I would like to thank Roman Kossak and Bartosz Wcis lo for several very
informative and helpful conversations relating to the material in this paper and Ali Enayat for
pointing out the papers [6] and [3] to me.
1.1. Basic Definitions. Throughout we will be interested in the language L = LPA of PA, which
for us includes a symbol ≤ for the natural ordering definable in PA. All of the results below
work equally well for any countable extension of LPA and any theory PA
∗, that is PA in that
language with induction extended to formulas in that language. Given a first order structure such
as M, N , Mα etc we always let the associated non-calligraphic letter, M , N , Mα etc denote the
universe of the model. When it won’t cause confusion this won’t be stated explicitly. For ease of
notation by a model we will always mean an L structure M modeling PA unless otherwise stated.
Also, throughout definable means definable with arbitrary parameters unless specified otherwise.
Since we’re looking at applications of set theory to models of arithmetic, and hoping to appeal to
researchers in both these fields, we have included more definitions and proof sketches than usual in
order to make this paper more self contained for the reader who is an expert in only one of these
subjects. For all undefined terms in the model theory of PA we suggest the reader consult [7]. For
set theory we recommend [8].
Definition 1.4. Let κ be a cardinal.
(1) A model M is κ-like if it has size κ but for all a ∈M |[0, a]| < κ.
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(2) By arithmetizing the language of arithmetic we can think of L-formulas as coded com-
putably by natural numbers. As such it makes sense to talk about a set of formulas as
being e.g. computable, arithmetic etc. A model M is recursively saturated if it realizes
every computable type with parameters.
(3) If M is a model, then a class is a subset A ⊆ M so that for all a ∈ M the set A ∩ a :=
{b ∈ A | M |= b < a} is definable M .
(4) A model M is rather classless if every class is definable.
(5) A κ-Kaufmann Model is a model M which is κ-like, recursively saturated and rather
classless. If κ = ω1 then we simply say M is a Kaufmann model.
We recall a brief sketch of the existence of Kaufmann models under ♦ as ideas from these
arguments will be used repeatedly throughout the paper.
Theorem 1.5 (Kaufmann [4]). If ♦ holds then every countable, recursively saturated model has
an elementary end extension which is Kaufmann.
Before sketching the proof we need to note a few things. First, recall that given two models M
and N we say that N is an elementary end extension of M, denoted M ≺end N if M ≺ N and
for every y ∈ N \M and x ∈ M we have N |= x ≤ y, i.e. (M,≤) is an initial segment of (N,≤).
The foundational MacDowell-Specker theorem states that every model of PA has an elementary
end extension, see [7, Theorem 2.2.8]. The proof of Theorem 1.5 uses the following lemma, which
is also due to Kaufmann.
Lemma 1.6 (Kaufmann [4]). Let M be a countable recursively saturated model and A ⊆ M . If
A is not definable, then there is a countable, recursively saturated model N so that M ≺end N
and A is not coded into N i.e. there is no a ∈ N so that a codes an N -finite sequence sa and
M ∩ sa = A.
Proof of Theorem 1.5. Fix a countable recursively saturated model M0 and a ♦ sequence ~A =
〈Aα | α < ω1〉. We want to define a continuous chain 〈Mα | α < ω1〉 of countable, recursively
saturated models so that Mα ≺end Mα+1 for all α < ω1 and the union of all the Mα’s will be
a Kaufmann model. This is done recursively. The universe of each model will be a countable
ordinal. Note that there will necessarily be a club of δ < ω1 so that Mδ = δ.
1 At limit stages
we have to take unions since the chain is continuous so it remains to say what to do at successor
stages. Suppose Mα has been defined. If Aα ⊆ Mα is undefinable let Mα+1 be as in Lemma
1.6, namely a countable, recursively saturated elementary end extension ofMα in which Aα is not
coded. If Aα is not an undefinable subset of Mα (either because it’s not a subset or because it’s
definable) then let Mα be any countable, recursively saturated elementary end extension of Mα.
This completes the construction.
Let M =
⋃
α<ω1
Mα. Clearly this model is an ω1-like, recursively saturated elementary end
extension of M0. The hard part is to show that it is rather classless. This is shown as follows:
suppose A ⊆ M is an undefinable class. It’s straightforward to show that the set of α so that
A ∩Mα is undefinable in Mα is club, thus by ♦ there is an α so that A ∩Mα = Aα. But then
A ∩Mα is not coded into Mα+1 by our construction contradicting the assumption that A is a
class. 
The sequence above 〈Mα | α < ω1〉 is commonly called a continuous, end-extensional filtration.
For short we will refer to such a sequence as simply a filtration.2
Definition 1.7. A filtration is an ω1-length sequence 〈Mα | α < ω1〉 of countable models so that
for α < β, Mα ≺end Mβ and for limit ordinals λ < ω1 Mλ =
⋃
ξ<λMξ. The filtration is said to be
recursively saturated if every Mα is recursively saturated.
1Here Mδ is the universe of Mδ, conforming to the convention mentioned in the first paragraph of this subsection
2Without the extra qualifiers this is not entirely standard, but this is the only type of filtration we will consider in
this paper so no confusion will arise.
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We will need the notion of a partial inductive satisfaction class. This idea has generated an
enormous amount of research and is central in the study of models of PA. We will only need a few
facts, which we cherry pick below, and refer the reader to the excellent monograph [7] for more
details. The definition we give, which comes from [9], is not standard but it’s easily seen that a
model has a partial inductive satisfaction class in the sense below if and only if it has one in the
sense defined e.g. in [7, Definition 1.9.1]. Recall that for each standard n < ω there is (provably,
in PA) a Σn formula Trn(x, y) so that for all Σn formulas ϕ(z) PA ⊢ ∀y[ϕ(y)↔ Trn(ϕ, y)]. Given
a model M |= PA let WMn denote the set of pairs (ϕ, a) so that ϕ(x) is a Σn formula with one free
variable from the point of view of M and M |= Trn(ϕ, a) i.e. M thinks that a satisfies ϕ.
Definition 1.8. Let M be a model. A set S ⊆M2 is called a partial inductive satisfaction class
if
(1) For all x ∈M Sx := {y | 〈y, x〉 ∈ S} is a set of pairs (ϕ, a) so that ϕ is a formula from the
point of view of M and a ∈M .
(2) For all n < ω we have Sn =Wn.
(3) (M,S) satisfies the induction scheme in the language expanded with a predicate for S.
Partial inductive satisfaction classes are the only types of satisfaction classes that will be dis-
cussed in this paper so we drop the qualifiers and refer to them simply as “satisfaction classes”.
Note that the definition above is unchanged if we fix a nonstandard a ∈ M and insist that for
every b ≥ a the set Sb = ∅.
As mentioned above κ-Kaufmann models can be seen as a witness to incompactness at a cardinal
κ. Schmerl has formalized this in the following striking way.
Theorem 1.9 (Schmerl, Theorem 3 of [9] ). If there is a κ-Kaufmann model, then there is a
κ-Aronszajn tree.
Roughly speaking the tree is the “tree of attempts to build a satisfaction class”.
Proof. Let M be a κ-Kaufmann model. We will define a subset T ⊆ M and a tree-like order on
T so that the levels of T are indexed by the elements of M, T has sequences of every order type
in M, the set of such sequences in a given order type has size less than κ, and there is no subset
B ⊆ T in order type ≤M . Clearly then any cofinal, well-founded subset of this “tree” will be a
κ-Aronszajn tree.
Fix a ∈ M non-standard. Let Wn denote the complete Σn-set (as defined in M), which we
think of an anM-indexed list of 0’s and 1’s corresponding to its characteristic function on the set
of pairs consisting of Σn formulas and elements of M (using some standard pairing function). The
tree T is the set of b ∈M so that there is a d ∈M and b codes a d× a sized matrix whose entries
are 0 or 1 and for which for each natural number n < ω the nth-column of b is an M-finite initial
segment of Wn. For elements b0, b1 ∈ T coding matrices of size d0 × a and d1 × a respectively we
let b0 ⊑T b1 if d0 < d1 and b0 = b1 ↾ (d0 × a). In words, b0 is below b1 if and only if b1 codes a
larger matrix whose restriction to the coordinates (d0× a) is b0 (end extend each column). This is
clearly a tree like order, it remains to see that it forms a tree as described in the first paragraph.
First let’s see that the levels have size <κ. Let Td := {b ∈ T | b codes a binary matrix of size d×
a}. Then since b ∈ Td implies b ∈ M and codes a sequence of size d × a there are at most 2d×a
elements of Td (as computed in M) so by κ-likeness |Td| < κ.
Now lets see that the tree has height κ. This follows immediately by recursive saturation. For
each b ∈ T and i < a let bn denote the nth column of the matrix coded by b. For any d ∈ M
consider the type pd(x) := {∃e > d (x codes a matrix of size e× a)} ∪ {xn ⊆Wn | n < ω}. Clearly
this is a finitely consistent, recursive type so it has a realization in M. But any such realization is
an element of height greater than d.
Finally there is no cofinal branch. This follows by rather classlessness: from any cofinal branch
we could define a satisfaction class by the definition of the tree, but since any satisfaction class
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is undefinable this can’t exist. See [9, Lemma 4.1] for a more detailed discussion of this last
point. Note that if κ is an uncountable regular cardinal then any class is inductive, see [7, pp.
258-259]. 
As Schmerl notes, what the proof above shows is that if κ has the tree property then every κ-like
recursively saturated model has a satisfaction class. Regardless of the properties of the order type
of M, the proof shows that given any recursively saturated model M, there is an associated tree
TMsat whose levels are cofinal in the model. Moreover, ifM is κ-like for some regular κ then T
M
sat has
a cofinal branch if and only if M has a satisfaction class. We will call such a tree the satisfaction
tree for M (relative to a).
Fix a Kaufmann modelM. Suppose P is a forcing notion, when does P “Mˇ is not Kaufmann”
? Obviously, if P collapses ℵ1 to be countable, then ω1-likeness is killed. Moreover, any cofinal
sequence in ordertype ω in a model is an undefinable class. What about if P does not collapse ω1?
This motivates the following definition.
Definition 1.10. A Kaufmann modelM is destructible if there is an ω1-preserving forcing notion
P so that P “Mˇ is not Kaufmann”.
In this language, an immediate corollary of Main Theorem 1.2 is the following.
Corollary 1.11. The existence of destructible Kaufmann models is independent of ZFC.
Before ending this section, let us make one observation about destructibility of Kaufmann models
that will guide the rest of the paper. Suppose M is a Kaufmann model and P is an ω1-preserving
forcing notion. Then in V P M is still ω1-like, and by absoluteness, there cannot be any new
recursive types, so M is still recursively saturated. Therefore, if P kills the Kaufmann-ness of M
it’s because it added an undefinable class. This is what we will use to kill Kaufmann models.
Finally, let us note that some similar ideas to those presented here were previously explored by
Enayat in [3]. In particular, in Theorem 4.2 of that paper Enayat observes that there are rather
classless models of ZFC− + V = Hℵ1 which remain rather classless in any forcing extension pre-
serving ω1. Thus in the language of this paper Enayat shows that there is always an indestructible
model of this theory.
2. Killing Destructible Kaufmann Models
In this section we prove the first part of Main Theorem 1.2. Specifically we show the following.
Theorem 2.1. Assume MAℵ1 . Then there are no destructible Kaufmann models.
The rest of this section is devoted to proving Theorem 2.1. Towards this, for the rest of the
section unless otherwise stated, assume MAℵ1 and fix a Kaufmann model M. We will show that
in any forcing extension if M has a new class, then ω1 is collapsed.
To prove Theorem 2.1 it will be convenient to relax the definition of a tree to allow the ranking
function to map into a model of PA as opposed to ordinals. For a given model M I call this an
M-tree. For instance, the tree TMsat of Theorem 1.9 is an M-tree. Most well known facts and
definitions about trees hold without change for M-trees. With the exception of the first, the
following definitions when applied to ordinal-ranked trees are standard.
Definition 2.2. Let T = 〈T,≤T 〉 be a tree-like order.
(1) We say T is ω1-like if there is a cofinal subset S ⊆ T which is well-founded and has height
ω1.
(2) If T is ω1-like we say that T is Aronszajn if it has no uncountable, linearly ordered subset.
(3) We say that T is special if there is a function f : T → ω so that if x ≤T y then f(x) 6= f(y).
(4) We say that T is weakly special if there is a function f : T → ω so that if x ≤T y, z and
f(x) = f(y) = f(z) then y and z are comparable in the ≤T ordering.
6 SWITZER
Note if M is ω1-like then any M-tree is ω1-like. The application of MAℵ1 needed to prove
Theorem 2.1 is the following fact, due to Baumgartner, Malitz and Reinhardt.
Fact 2.3 (Theorem 4 of [1]). Assume MAℵ1 . Let T be an ω1-like tree-like partial order of size ℵ1.
If T is Aronszajn then T is special.
We also need the following, well known fact.
Lemma 2.4. Suppose T is an ω1-like tree-like order. If T is weakly special then any forcing adding
a cofinal branch collapses ω1.
Proof. Suppose f : T → ω witnesses that T is weakly special, P is a forcing notion and P “b˙ ⊆ Tˇ
is a new, cofinal branch”. Let G ⊆ P be generic over V and let b = b˙G. We claim that (in the
extension) for each n < ω the set f−1({n})∩ b is bounded. Note that this implies the lemma since
we will have that b, which is a set of size ℵV1 can be covered by countably many countable sets.
To see the claim, suppose for some n < ω we have that p  fˇ−1“({nˇ}) ∩ b˙ is unbounded”. By
strengthening if necessary, we may assume that p decides some x ∈ T is in b˙ and f(x) = n. Now
since b˙ is forced to be new there are incompatible extensions p0 and p1 of p and incompatible
elements x0 and x1 extending x so that for i < 2 pi  xi ∈ b˙ and f(xi) = n. But this contradicts
the defining property of f . 
The above lemma applies in particular toM-trees. TheM-tree that will be relevant here is the
tree of M-finite sequences, TMfin. This tree is defined as follows. Given an ω1-like model of M let
TMfin be the set of all x ∈ M thought of as binary M-finite sequences with x ≤fin y just in case
M |=“The finite binary sequence coded by x is an initial segment of the finite sequence coded by
y”. Note the order is definable in M. An element x is on level a just in case the binary sequence
it codes has length a. Observe that this tree has uncountably many levels since M thinks there
are finite binary sequences of length a for every a ∈M but each level is countable since there are
only 2a many such sequences (as computed in M) and, externally, by ω1-likeness, 2
a is countable.
Lemma 2.5. Under MAℵ1 T
M
fin is weakly special for any Kaufmann model M.
The proof of this lemma uses the fact that if the conclusion of Fact 2.3 holds then any tree of
cardinality ℵ1 with at most ℵ1 many uncountable branches is weakly special. For (well-founded)
trees, this result is well known, see [2, Corollary 7.8]. The proof goes through verbatim forM-trees
whenM is ω1-like, but we give the details below for the sake of completeness, as well as to present
the proof to model theorists of arithmetic who may not be as familiar with these ideas as set
theorists.
Proof. Since M is rather classless TMfin has ℵ1-many classes and hence ℵ1 many uncountable
branches. Enumerate all the uncountable branches by B = {bα | α < ω1}. Fix an injection
g : B → TMfin so that for each α g(bα) ∈ bα. By [2, Lemma 7.6], one can choose g so that whenever
g(bα) <fin g(bβ) then g(bβ) /∈ bα. Now let S = {t ∈ TMfin | ∀b ∈ B if t ∈ b then t ≤fin g(b)}. This is
a tree-like order with the order inherited from TMfin. Moreover, it’s uncountable since it contains
the range of g. It has no uncountable branches. To see this, towards a contradiction, suppose that
b were an uncountable branch through S. Let b¯ = {t ∈ T | ∃s ∈ b t <fin s} i.e. the downward
closure of b in TMfin. This must be an uncountable branch through T . But then since g(b¯) ∈ b¯ we
get an s ∈ b with g(b¯) ≤fin s contradicting the definition of S.
Applying Fact 2.3, MAℵ1 implies that S is special. Let f : S → ω be such a specializing function.
Let t ∈ TMfin \ S. We extend f to include t as follows. Since t /∈ S there is a branch b so that
t ∈ b but g(b) ≤TM
fin
t. This branch is unique: If g(bα) <fin g(bβ) <fin t with t ∈ bα ∩ bβ then
in particular g(bβ) ∈ bα which contradicts the choice of g. Now let f(t) = f(g(b)) for this unique
branch.
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Claim 2.6. f : T → ω has the property that if f(s) = f(t) = f(u) and s ≤T t, u then t and u are
comparable, i.e. it witnesses that TMfin is weakly special.
Proof. Let s ≤T t, u be as in the claim. Since f(t) = f(s) at least one of t and s is not in S since f
is injective on chains in S. In fact neither s nor t are in S unless s = g(b) for some b. To see this,
first note that if s ∈ S then, since t /∈ S we would have that there is some b so that b is the unique
branch with t ∈ b and g(b) ≤TM
fin
t and, since s ∈ b as well and s ∈ S we have that s ≤fin g(b) and
so either s = g(b) or f(s) 6= f(g(b)) = f(t) which is a contradiction. Similarly if t ∈ S then since
s /∈ S there is some branch c so that s ∈ c but g(c) ≤fin s and since g(c), t ∈ S and g(c) <fin t we
have that f(g(c)) 6= t but this is a contradiction since f(g(c)) = f(s) = f(t).
Now, let b be the unique branch so that t ∈ b and g(b) ≤fin t. As noted before, s ∈ b as well.
If s <fin g(b) then there is a branch c 6= b so that s ∈ c and g(c) ≤T s (since either s = g(c) or is
above it, by the argument in the previous paragraph). But now g(c), g(b) ∈ S and g(c) <fin g(b)
so f(g(c)) 6= f(g(b)) but this is a contradiction since f(s) = f(g(c)) and f(t) = f(g(b)). Therefore
g(b) ≤fin s, b = c and hence s ∈ b. A symmetric argument allows one to conclude the same for u
so t, s, u ∈ b and hence are comparable. 
Since the claim is proved the lemma is as well. 
Let’s now conclude the proof of Theorem 2.1.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Assume MAℵ1 and fix a Kaufmann model M. Combining Lemmas 2.4 and
2.5, it remains to show that if P is a forcing notion adding a class to M then P must add a branch
to TMfin. To see this, note that if A ⊆M is a class, then for every x ∈M the characteristic function
of A ∩ x is in M so it is an element of TMfin. Hence the characteristic function of A is a branch
through TMfin. Since forcing cannot add new elements to M , or change definablility it must be the
case that TMfin stays the same in any forcing extension and hence adding a class adds a branch to
this tree. This completes the proof though since adding the branch collapses ω1 by Lemma 2.4. 
Before moving on to the proof of the second part of Main Theorem 1.2, let’s observe some easy
extensions of Theorem 2.1. These involve the following two observations from the proof: first was
that we did not need MAℵ1 only that every Aronszajn, ω1-like tree-like partial order of cardinality
ℵ1 which embeds into an ω1-like tree-like partial order with countable levels is special and second
is that we didn’t use the fact that M was rather classless (or recursively saturated), only that
it had ℵ1-many classes. Therefore we actually have the following result which gives a stronger
conclusion from a weaker hypothesis.
Theorem 2.7. If M is ω1-like, has ≤ ℵ1-many classes and every Aronszajn M-tree which embeds
into TMfin is special then there is no ω1-preserving forcing adding a class to M.
Using the forcing of [11], the above hypothesis can be forced over a model of CH without adding
reals so it’s consistent with CH that there are no destructible Kaufmann models. In fact the
following is consistent.
Corollary 2.8. It’s consistent that CH holds and for all ω1-like models M, if M has ≤ ℵ1-many
classes then there is no ω1-preserving forcing adding a class to M .
Finally let us note that if there is an ω1-like model with more than ℵ1-many classes then TMfin
is a Kurepa tree. Since it’s consistent (relative to an inaccessible) that there are no Kurepa trees
it’s consistent that there is no ω1-preserving forcing notion adding a class to any ω1-like model of
PA.
Corollary 2.9. From an inaccessible it’s consistent, both with CH and without CH, that any forcing
notion adding a class to an ω1-like model of PA collapses ω1.
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Proof. By what has been said it suffices to note that from an inaccessible, MAℵ1 can be forced
alongside the failure of Kurepa’s hypothesis and (for the CH case) a countable support iteration of
the main forcing from [11] of length κ for κ inaccessible plus some routine bookkeeping works. 
Note that it was observed by Keisler [6] that if there is a Kurepa tree, then there is a modelM
so that TMfin is Kurepa, so the inaccessible is needed.
3. Building a Destructible Kaufmann Model
In this section we prove the second part of Main Theorem 1.2. Specifically we show the following.
Theorem 3.1. Assume ♦. Then there is a Kaufmann model M so that the satisfaction tree TMsat
contains a Souslin subtree and hence is destructible.
The “hence” part follows by observing that forcing with the Souslin tree is ccc, and therefore
ω1-preserving, but the generic branch will define a satisfaction class for M as explained in the
proof of Theorem 1.9. The idea behind the proof is to use the diamond sequence to weave to-
gether Kaufmann’s original argument for the existence of a Kaufmann model with Jensen’s classic
argument of the existence of a Souslin tree.
Now we prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof. Fix a diamond sequence ~A = 〈Aα | α < ω1〉, a countable, recursively saturated model M0
and a nonstandard element a ∈ M0. As in the proof of Theorem 1.5, we will build a filtration
of countable, recursively saturated models 〈Mα | α < ω1〉 however this time we will also build a
⊆-increasing continuous sequence of sets 〈Sα | α < ω1〉 so that for all α < ω1 we have Sα ⊆ Mα,
andM =
⋃
α<ω1
Mα is a Kaufmann model and S :=
⋃
α<ω1
Sα is a Souslin subtree of T
M
sat relative
to a.
We construct (Mα, Sα) recursively. The construction essentially mirrors Kaufmann’s original
construction of a Kaufmann model from ♦ done at the same time as Jensen’s original construction
of a Souslin tree from ♦. Given anyMα let T
α
sat be the satisfaction tree for Mα relative to a. We
already gave M0, let S0 be T 0sat. Assume that we have constructed (Mξ, Sξ) for all ξ < α, and
that for each ξ < α Mξ is a countable recursively saturated end extension of is predecessors, Sξ
is a a subset of T ξsat which intersects every level d ∈Mξ and so that each t ∈ Sξ has extensions on
all levels above it. Without loss, we can assume that each Mξ is a set of countable ordinals. As
before there will be a club of ξ so that Mξ = ξ.
Case 1: α is a limit ordinal. By the requirements we have, Mα =
⋃
ξ<αMξ and Sα =
⋃
ξ<α Sξ.
Case 2: α = β + 1 for some β. If Aβ ⊆Mβ is an undefinable class then extend Mβ as in Lemma
1.6 so that Aβ is not coded into Mα. Otherwise let Mα be any countable, recursively saturated
end extension. Note the priority: we have Mα now and will use it to define Sα.
If Aβ ⊆ Sβ is a maximal antichain, then do as follows. First choose a level b ∈ Mα \Mβ and,
for each of the countably many t ∈ Sβ choose exactly one st ∈ Aβ comparable with t and one
element ust,t ∈ T
α
sat on the b
th level that extends both st and t. Note that by the maximality
of Aβ there is such an s for each t and by recursive saturation in Mα there is such a ust,s. The
set of all such ust,t will be the b
th level of the Souslin tree we’re constructing. Specifically, let
S−α = Sβ ∪ {ust,t | t ∈ Sβ} and let Sα be the downward closure of S
−
α in T
α
sat alongside every
extension of an element in S−α in T
α
sat to the levels b
′ > b in Mα.
If Aβ is not a maximal antichain of Sβ then let Sα be simply the collection of all extensions in
Tαsat of every node in Sβ to every level in Mα \Mβ. This completes the construction.
Let M =
⋃
α<ω1
Mα and let S =
⋃
α<ω1
Sα. The verification that M is Kaufmann is verbatim
as in Theorem 1.5.
To see that S is a Souslin tree, suppose that A ⊆ S is a maximal antichain. I claim that there is
a club of ξ so that A∩Sξ is a maximal antichain in Sξ. Let C denote the set of all such ξ. Clearly
C is closed since any increasing union of maximal antichains will again be a maximal antichain.
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To see that C is unbounded, fix an ordinal ξ := ξ0. If A ∩ Sξ is not maximal then, for each of the
countably many elements t ∈ Sξ not comparable with anything in A∩Sξ find some element at ∈ A
which is comparable with them. Let ξ1 > ξ0 be such that A ∩ Sξ1 contains all of these at (ξ1 is
countable since there are only countably many things to add). Continuing in this way, recursively
define for each n < ω a countable ordinal ξn+1 > ξn so that every a ∈ A ∩ Sξn is comparable with
something in A∩ Sξn+1 . Finally let ξω := supn∈ωξn. Clearly A∩Sξω is maximal by the continuity
requirement of the construction.
It follows by ♦ that there is an ξ so that Aξ = A ∩ Sξ. But then there is a level d ∈ Mξ+1 so
that every element of Aξ is comparable with a node t of height d by our construction so if s ∈ TMsat
is of height greater than d then s /∈ A since it’s comparable with some node in Aξ ⊆ A. Thus A is
bounded and therefore countable.

As a remark, let us note that the above construction can also be done via forcing: let (M0, S0, a)
be as above and P be the set of pairs (M, SM ) so that M0 ≺ M, M is recursively saturated,
countable, S0 ⊆ SM and SM ⊆ TMsat, which has non-empty intersection with every level in M .
The order is pairwise by elementary end extension and end extension as a partially ordered set.
This forcing is countably closed and the verification that it adds a destructible Kaufmann model
goes through exactly as in the proof of the theorem, replacing the ♦ construction by a collection
of density arguments. I do not know if the second coordinate is necessary or if forcing with the
models alone will make the resulting generic Kaufmann model destructible, though I suspect that
this is the case. However, this forcing construction is weaker than the proof from diamond since
the forcing, being countably closed and adding a subset to ω1, adds a diamond sequence.
Finally we note that even though ♦ implies CH, it’s consistent that there are destructible
Kaufmann models and the continuum is arbitrarily large.
Proposition 3.2. Assume ♦, then there is a destructible Kaufmann model in the extension by
any number of Cohen reals.
Proof. Suppose M and S are as in the proof of Theorem 3.1 (the ♦ hypothesis guarantees their
existence). Let P be the forcing to add λ many Cohen reals for your favorite λ. Since P is ccc, it
preserves ω1 hence M remains an ω1-like recursively saturated model. Moreover, Cohen forcing
neither kills Souslin trees nor adds branches to ω1-trees (like T
M
fin) so it cannot add a class to M
nor kill the Souslin-ness of S. Hence M is still a Kaufmann model and S is still a ccc forcing
adding a satisfaction class. 
4. Axiomatizability of Kaufmann Models
In this section we prove Main Theorem 1.3. The proof involves the logic, Lω1,ω(Q) the infinitary
logic Lω1,ω enriched with the quantifier Q where the interpretation of Qxϕ(x) is “there exist
uncountably many x so that ϕ(x) holds”. Recall from [5] that a standard model of Lω1,ω(Q) is a
structure M = 〈M, [M ]≥ω1 , ...〉 so that for any formula ϕ(x¯, y) and any a¯ ∈ M ln(x¯) we have that
M |= Qyϕ(a¯, y) if and only if the set {y ∈ M | M |= ϕ(a¯, y)} is uncountable. There is also a
relatively straightforward, arithmetic Hilbert-style notion of proof for this logic, see [5, p. 69]. In
[5, Theorem 4.10] Keisler proved the following completeness theorem.
Theorem 4.1 (Keisler). For any sentence of Lω1,ω(Q) ψ we have that ⊢ ψ if and only if for every
standard model M in the vocabulary of ψ we have M |= ψ.
Note that this theorem implies that if an Lω1,ω(Q) sentence from V has a model in some forcing
extension, then it has one in the ground model via generic absoluteness. This is the key step in
Shelah’s argument that there are Kaufmann models in ZFC. One thing to note is that formulas of
Lω1,ω(Q) are coded by reals so in forcing extensions adding reals, one adds new formulas.
I will need the following, elementary observation.
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Observation 4.2. SupposeM is an L-structure for some L and P is a forcing notion that preserves
ω1. Then for any Lω1,ω(Q) formula ψ(x¯) and any tuple a¯ in M we have that M |= ψ(a¯) if and
only if P“Mˇ |= ψ(a¯)”.
Roughly this observation amounts to saying that Lω1,ω(Q) truth cannot be changed by ω1-
preserving forcing.
Proof. The proof is by induction on ψ. Since Lω1,ω satisfaction is absolute between forcing exten-
sions and grounds the only non obvious case is when ψ is of the form Qxϕ(x, y¯). However, this
follows immediately by the inductive hypothesis and the fact that P preserves ω1. 
Using these results and the proofs of Theorems 2.1 and 3.1 we will show the following.
Theorem 4.3. (1) Under MAℵ1 there is an Lω1,ω(Q) sentence ψ in the language of PA en-
riched with a single unary function symbol f , LPA(f), so that a model M |= PA is Kauf-
mann if and only if there is an expansion of M to an LPA(f)-structure satisfying ψ.
(2) Under ♦ there is a Kaufmann model M so that given any expansion L′ of the language of
PA and any expansion of M to an L′-structure, M′, and any countable set L of Lω1,ω(Q)
sentences in the signature L′ there is a model N which agrees with M′ about the truth
of every L-sentence but carries a satisfaction class for its L-reduct. In particular, the
L-reduct of N is not rather classless.
Remark 1. The wording of Part 2 is a little verbose. The point is that, even enriching M with
any amount of extra structure, we can always find a model which agrees with M on any Lω1,ω(Q)
sentence and has a satisfaction class. Thus, in contrast to the case under MAℵ1 , no amount of
extra structure suffices to axiomatize Kaufmann models in Lω1,ω(Q).
As mentioned in the introduction Part 1 of the above theorem can be inferred easily from the
proof of [10, Theorem 6]. I’m not sure if this was observed at the time. We give a complete, self
contained proof here however for the convenience of the reader. Note that in the proof we will
often write sentences in the signature of LPA involving natural numbers, n < ω. By this we will
always mean the formal term n := S(S(...(S(0))...)) (with n iterations of the successor function
S). Since every model of PA contains a copy of the natural numbers there is no ambiguity in this.
Proof of Part 1 of Theorem 4.3. Assume MAℵ1 holds. First observe that ifM is a model then one
can easily write down being ω1-like and recursively saturated in Lω1,ω(Q) as follows.
(1) M is ω1-like if and only if it satisfies Qx(x = x) ∧ ∀y¬Qx(x ≤ y)
(2) M is recursively saturated if and only if it satisfies
∀y¯
∧
p(x,y¯) a computable type(
∧
Φ(x,y¯) finite subset of p(x,y¯) ∃xΦ(x, y¯)→ ∃x
∧
ϕ(x,y¯)∈p(x,y¯) ϕ(x, y¯))
Therefore, what we need to show is that there is a sentence ψ in the language LPA(f) so that a
modelM is rather classless if and only if there is a function fM :M →M so that 〈M, ..., fM 〉 |= ψ.
The idea is that f will be a weak specializing function for the tree TMfin (which exists by MAℵ1)
and using this function we will be able to say that all uncountable branches are definable. Shelah’s
sentence from [10] says more or less the same, though because we’re not working in the general
setup he works in there we can simplify things slightly. First note that f being essentially special
can be expressed as follows:
ES(f) := ∀x[
∨
n<ω
f(x) = n] ∧ ∀s, t, u[f(s) = f(t) = f(u) ∧ s ≤fin t, u→ (t ≤fin u ∨ u ≤fin t)]
So it remains to show that, for an essentially specializing function f , we can write down that
f witnesses that M is rather classless. The sentence is as follows, below “RC” means “rather
classless”:
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RC(f) := ∀s
∨
n<ω(f(s) = n ∧Qt(f(s) = f(t) = n ∧ s fin t))→ ∃a¯
∨
ϕ∈LPA
[∀yϕ(y, a¯)↔
∃t(s ≤fin t ∧ t(y) = 1 ∧ f(t) = n)]
Note that since elements of TMfin are (coded) binary sequences the notation “t(y) = 1” makes sense.
The reader should convince themselves that in English the above says the following:
“For all s, if for some n f(s) = n and there are uncountably many t so that s ≤fin t and f(t) = n
then there are an a¯ and a formula ϕ ∈ LPA so that for all y ϕ(y, a¯) if and only if t(y) = 1 for some
t with s ≤fin t and f(t) = n.”
Since, by the proof of Theorem 2.1, we know that every Kaufmann model’s TMfin is essentially
special, we need to show that M is Kaufmann if and only if its essentially specializing function f
satisfies RC(f). Here are the details. First suppose that M is an ω1-like, recursively saturated
model of PA which has an expansion to LPA(f) satisfying ES(f)∧RC(f). Fix such an fM :M →
M . Let b be an uncountable branch through TMfin. We need to show that there is a formula ϕ and
a tuple a¯ so that for all y ∈ M , ∪b(y) = 1 if and only if M |= ϕ(y, a¯). By RC(fM ) then there is
an a¯ and a formula ϕ ∈ LPA so that for all y ϕ(y, a¯) if and only if there is a t above s with t(y) = 1
and f(t) = n. By the property of weak specializing functions, if s ≤fin t and f(t) = n then t ∈ b.
Therefore ∪b(y) = 1 if and only if ϕ(y, a¯) as required.
For the converse, suppose M is a Kaufmann model and let fM be a weak specializing for TMfin
(which exists byMAℵ1). We claim that this f
M satisfies RC(f). To see this, fix s ∈ TMfin and n < ω
and suppose that fM (s) = n there are uncountably many t above s in TMfin with f
M (t) = n. Then
the set of these t must generate a cofinal branch b by weak specialness so we can define that branch
as ∪b(y) = 1 if and only if M |= ϕ(y, a¯) by rather classlessness, hence RC(f) is satisfied. 
Before continuing on to the proof of Part 2, let me comment on the relation between this proof
and Shelah’s [10, Theorem 6]. This theorem, despite being foundational in the field seems to
have been very rarely written down aside from in the original article. Restricted to the case of
Kaufmann models, Shelah’s proof shows much the same as what is shown above. The difference is
that he replaces the application of MAℵ1 by a concrete use of a ccc forcing to specialize T
M
fin. As
a result his proof shows (in our language) that every LPA reduct of a model of ES(f) ∧RC(f) is
Kaufmann (this is identical to the backward direction above) and, for every Kaufmann model M
there is a ccc forcing extension of V in which M has an expansion to a model of ES(f) ∧RC(f)
(using MAℵ1 instead of forcing this is the forward direction). By composing this result with
Theorem 1.5 Shelah gets that every model of set theory has a forcing extension in which there is a
model of ES(f) ∧RC(f). By Keisler’s completeness theorem it follows that in V this sentence is
consistent and hence has a model. But then that model’s reduct to LPA is Kaufmann thus proving
that ZFC suffices to prove the existence of Kaufmann models. A natural question is whether the
detour through forcing extensions was necessary in this argument. Part 2 will show that, at least
sometimes, the answer is “yes”.
Proof of Part 2 of Theorem 4.3. LetM be the model constructed in the proof of Theorem 3.1 and
let S be the Souslin subtree of TMsat. The existence of this model is the only application of ♦. Let
L′ ⊇ LPA be any language extending the language of PA and M′ be any expansion of M to an
L′ structure. We need to show that there is an N which agrees with M′ on any countably many
Lω1,ω(Q) sentences but whose L-reduct has a satisfaction class (and hence is not rather classless).
Since S is Souslin, the Lω1,ω(Q) theory of M is the same in V as in any generic extension of V
by S by Observation 4.2 plus the fact that, since any Souslin tree is ω-distributive, S won’t add
new reals and hence it won’t add new Lω1,ω(Q) sentences either. Let G ⊆ S be generic and work
in V [G]. In this model, the branch G codes a satisfaction class AG for M. Consider a new theory,
T in the language L′ enriched with a unary predicate A giving the Lω1,ω theory of M
′ in L′ plus
“A is a satisfaction class”. This theory is consistent, since 〈M ′, ..., AG〉 is a model and, moreover,
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it is V since it’s the union of a theory in V with a simple set of additional sentences, definable in
any model of set theory. Since consistency is absolute between models of set theory with the same
natural numbers, V |=“T is consistent”. Hence by Keisler’s completeness theorem, any countable
subtheory T¯ ⊆ T has a model N with a satisfaction class. Consider the reduct of N to L′. This
model is exactly what we wanted so the proof is complete.

It’s tempting to conclude in the above proof that N can be made to be fully Lω1,ω(Q) equivalent
to M′ but Keisler’s theorem is sentence by sentence and since Lω1,ω lacks a compactness theorem,
it’s not clear that this conclusion can be made, hence the restriction to countable subtheories. I’m
not sure whether the stronger conclusion is consistent or not, though I suspect that it is.
5. Conclusion and Open Questions
There remain many open questions in this area. I want to finish this paper by listing some. The
most interesting is the following.
Question 1. Is there a non-forcing-theoretic characterization of destructible Kaufmann models? Is
this related to some sort of resplendency or something truth theoretic?
Regarding the construction of destructible Kaufmann models by forcing:
Question 2. Does forcing with countable, recursively saturated models ordered by end extension
add a Kaufmann model whose satisfaction tree is Souslin (not just having a Souslin subtree)?
Also, it’s worth asking:
Question 3. What tree types can a satisfaction tree take? In particular, can the satisfaction tree
for a Kaufmann model be Souslin (and not just contain a Souslin subtree)? What about trees
types for trees of the form TMfin?
This paper is not the first to consider strong logics in the context of Kaufmann models. Sur-
prisingly though the following appears to be open.
Question 4. Which logics extending Lω,ω can axiomatize Kaufmann models provably in ZFC?
Consistently?
Finally, while this entire discussion has concerned ℵ1-Kaufmann models, there seems to be a
wealth of possible directions in studying general κ-Kaufmann models. Note that by Schmerl’s
Theorem 1.9, if κ has the tree property then there are no κ-Kaufmann models. The converse of
this appears to be open.
Question 5. Does the statement “there are no ℵ2-Kaufmann models” imply the tree property on
ℵ2? What is the consistency strength of “there are no ℵ2-Kaufmann models”?
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